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An expert psychiatrist testified for the defense that John W. Hinckley,
Jr., could not be held accountable for shooting the President of the United
States because he was "suffering from a major depressive disorder and
from process schizophrenia. . . ."I No, replied the government, Hinckley
was sane and should be found guilty because, as its expert testified, he
was only "suffering from dysthymic disorder, or depressive neurosis, and
from three types of personality disorder-schizoid, narcissistic, and
mixed-the last with borderline and passive-aggressive features."
'2
These snatches of expert testimony demonstrate, I think, that a con-
tested insanity defense almost invariably requires that a lay jury decide
the degree to which a defendant is mentally ill, and not merely whether a
defendant is mentally ill. After all, most of us would agree that a person
who attempts to assassinate the President at close range and in broad
daylight is, to use the vernacular, "crazy." But on what grounds does a
jury decide whether that defendant is so removed from normal behavior
that basic jurisprudential rules of personal culpability no longer apply?
And, when a jury is asked to make that determination, to what degree
does psychiatric testimony actually enable it "to make a sensible and edu-
cated determination about the mental condition of the defendant at the
time of the offense[?] '
This murky intersection of psychiatry and law is the subject of Lincoln
t Mr. Sallet is associated with the Washington, D.C. law firm of Miller, Cassidy, Larroca &
Lewin and, in that capacity, assisted in the representation of two fact-witnesses who testified in the
trial of United States v. Hinckley. Neither witness offered an expert opinion on Mr. Hincldey's
mental state.
1. L. CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 68 (1984)
[hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. P. 69.
3. Ake v. Oklahoma, 53 U.S.L.W. 4179, 4183 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1985). As discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 12-19, the Supreme Court held in Ake that an indigent defendant's access to
psychiatric assistance is constitutionally mandated where the defendant's sanity is likely to be a signif-
icant factor at trial.
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Caplan's book, The Insanity Defense and the Trial ofJohn W. Hinckley,
Jr. As the title suggests, the trial of John Hinckley is the lens through
which Caplan views the history of and current controversy surrounding
the insanity defense. Mr. Hinckley is not the exclusive focus of the book,
however; Caplan also shows us the workings of the insanity defense in the
case of Rufus Adams, an indigent tried during the same period in the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia. From his observations of
these two trials and of recent legislative actions to curb the use of the
insanity defense, Caplan concludes that efforts to abolish or limit the de-
fense constitute a false trade-off: Liberty is sacrificed without a concommi-
tant gain in increased security for members of society. While Caplan's
critique of recent congressional reform efforts is overly broad, his account
of the Hinckley trial, and his assessment of the implications of the trial for
the future of both the insanity defense and civil liberties, are worthy of
wide attention.
I.
Neither Caplan's conclusions nor the surrounding debate can be ade-
quately discussed without an understanding of the differing legal formula-
tions of the insanity defense, or of the facts of the Hinckley case. Consider
the following three hypotheticals. First, a man strangles his wife while
believing that he is actually throttling a ceramic duck. Because homicide is
a crime that requires a showing of specific intent, that defendant will not
need to rely on the insanity defense in order to escape a guilty verdict.
The defendant never formed the intent to murder a human being, and the
government, therefore, will be unable to prove the mens rea element of
the crime. In 1982, the Reagan Administration proposed that Congress
effectively abolish the insanity defense by limiting the introduction of evi-
dence of mental disease or defect to situations in which the defendant
failed to form the intent necessary to commit the crime. Thus, as then-
Attorney General Smith explained, a defendant on trial for committing
murder with a handgun could raise a defense based on his mental state
"only if the defendant did not even know he had a gun in his hand or
thought, for example, that he was shooting at a tree."'
Second, a man strangles his wife fully intending to kill her, but does so
believing that she is controlled by extra-terrestrials who are using her as
part of a conspiracy to conquer Earth. This defendant does have the mens
rea necessary to support a verdict of homicide because he intended to
murder a human being. But he committed the act at a time when, "as a
result of a severe mental disease or defect, [he] was unable to appreciate
4. P. 111.
1546
Vol. 94: 1545, 1985
Insanity Defense
the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts."' Under this "cog-
nitive" standard, which was endorsed by the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation ("A.P.A."), and recently codified by Congress, the defendant is not
guilty by reason of insanity.' The abolitionist view, however, would treat
this defendant as guilty of homicide because he had the necessary mens
rea when committing the crime.
Third, a man strangles his wife intending to kill her, while knowing it
is wrong to do so. He asserts that he had previously quarrelled with his
wife and that he was so enraged that he was unable to prevent himself
from taking murderous revenge. At trial, his attorney argues that, because
of mental illness, the defendant lacked the capacity to conform his behav-
ior to the requirements of the law. Such a contention-if believed by the
jury-would establish a defense of insanity under the jury instruction
given at the Hinckley trial and under the standard proposed by the Amer-
ican Law Institute, both of which include a "volitional" element con-
cerned with a defendant's ability to behave in accordance with legal re-
quirements.7 The defendant would be guilty, however, under the new
federal statute and the A.P.A. proposal: Each treats as irrelevant the issue
whether a defendant could conform his actions to the requirements of the
law. Of course, the abolition of the insanity defense once advocated by the
Reagan Administration would also result in a guilty verdict in this case.
The essential facts of the Hinckley case are by now well-known. John
W. Hinckley, Jr., entered Texas Tech University in 1974. For the next
seven years he drifted about, residing at various times in Texas, Califor-
nia, and Colorado. During the summer of 1976, Hinckley lived in
Hollywood where he watched the film Taxi Driver fifteen times at a local
theater. Taxi Driver is the story of Travis Bickle, who intends to assassi-
nate a presidential candidate but who instead saves a twelve-year-old
prostitute, played by Jodie Foster, by shooting her pimp and one of her
customers. Because of his new-found hero status, Travis is finally able to
5. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402(a), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2057 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 20).
6. In 1982, the American Psychiatric Association announced its support of the cognitive standard,
see American Psychiatric Association, Statement on the Insanity Defense 11-12 (Dec. 1982), and
Congress enacted it into law in 1984. See supra note 5.
7. The jury at the Hinckley trial was instructed on both the cognitive and the volitional standards.
The judge explained that:
The burden is on the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that the defen-
dant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect on March 30, 1981, or else that he
nevertheless had substantial capacity on that date both to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law and to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
P. 97. This instruction is based on the proposal of the American Law Institute that: "A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect
he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, at 66 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
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attract the attention of a beautiful woman he earlier had pursued
unsuccessfully.
By the fall of 1980, Hinckley was apparently obsessed with two people:
Jodie Foster and the President of the United States. During the next few
months Hinckley repeatedly flew to New Haven, telephoned Foster, and
left her notes. He also purchased handguns and tracked President Carter's
campaign travels, first to Dayton, Ohio, and then to Nashville, Tennessee.
In March, 1981, Hinckley again traveled to New Haven and left hand-
written notes for Foster.
On March 30, 1981, Hinckley was in Washington, D.C., where he
read President Reagan's schedule in a local newspaper, loaded his hand-
gun with Devastator bullets-which explode on impact-and left a letter
in his hotel room addressed to Foster. The letter read, in part:
There is a definite possibility that I will be killed in my attempt to
get Reagan ...
* , . [T]he reason I'm going ahead with this attempt now is be-
cause I just cannot wait any longer to impress you.. . . By sacrific-
ing my freedom and possibly my life, I hope to change your mind
about me.8
That afternoon, Hinckley waited outside the Washington Hilton and,
when the President emerged, Hinckley shot six times, seriously wounding
the President and four others.
II.
Caplan presents these facts in considerably more detail and with greater
emphasis on Hinckley's familial and emotional history, but these basic
facts underlay both the government and defense theories presented during
Hinckley's trial. The government emphasized the premeditated nature of
Hinckley's actions: Hinckley had bought a gun; followed President
Carter; traveled to Washington; left a note stating his intentions; selected
Devastator bullets from among the ammunition he had on hand; waited
for President Reagan to leave the hotel; and fired six shots at the
President.
To the defense, these same actions were indications of Hinckley's
mental illness. Hinckley was obsessed with the story of Taxi Driver and
with attracting Foster's attention. He hoped to win the affection of Jodie
Foster by killing the President. Hinckley may have intended to assassinate
the President, but he ultimately did so only because he was suffering delu-
8. P. 11.
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sions that rendered him incapable of behaving in a sane, responsible
fashion.
Because of this difference between the government and defense theories
of Hinckley's behavior, his trial came to focus on opposing teams of psy-
chiatric experts-Park Dietz and Sally Johnson for the government, and
William Carpenter and David Bear for the defense. Dr. Bear was partic-
ularly visible during the trial because of his challenges to the manner in
which the law deals with psychiatric diagnoses. At the time of Dr. Bear's
testimony, Judge Barrington Parker had ruled that the defense could not
introduce into evidence a CAT-scan of Hinckley's brain. Dr. Bear lec-
tured the court on the role of the CAT-scan in his diagnosis and an-
nounced that "I would like the right to state to the jury that an important
test which I use in reaching my conclusions has been barred by the court
and I was not able to present it to the jury, though I believe it would
influence their decision as it has influenced mine."9
Dr. Bear's concern nicely touches upon two issues likely to catch the
attention of any trial lawyer: the quality of evidence used to prove the
state of mind of a defendant, and the proper role of a psychiatrist at a
criminal trial. The mens rea element of a criminal offense is, almost by
definition, more difficult to establish than the actus reus element. Video-
tape can capture a politician taking money and putting it into a briefcase,
but no scientific instrument can directly monitor the interior workings of
the politician's mind. A jury is necessarily left to sift through circumstan-
tial evidence of a defendant's external actions and statements in order to
discern the defendant's knowledge and intent. That task is difficult
enough when A strikes B, and A says he acted out of fear of imminent
attack. The jury's role is much more complex when A strikes B, A says he
is insane and, as in the Hinckley case, competing experts offer the jury
conflicting psychiatric diagnoses.
At the Hinckley trial, defense attorneys hoped to use tangible evi-
dence-a CAT-scan of Hinckley's brain-to diminish the uncertainty sur-
rounding Hinckley's mental state. Dr. Bear told the court that the CAT-
scan showed widened folds and ridges (sulci) and that such widened sulci
appear more frequently in schizophrenics (one of three) than in the nor-
mal population (one of fifty).10 Over the government's objections, the de-
fense eventually convinced the court to rule that the CAT-scan was evi-
dence relevant to their claim that Hinckley was a schizophrenic.
This episode reflects the skepticism with which the law treats scientific
evidence: Only evidence that is demonstrably reliable is permitted to go to
9. P. 84. Judge Parker subsequently reversed his decision to forbid the defense to introduce the
CAT-scan into evidence. See p. 85.
10. P. 80.
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the jury." The admission of unreliable evidence-espeially unreliable ev-
idence cloaked in a patina of scientific authority-may result in unfair
verdicts and, over time, in unequal application of the law to similarly-
situated defendants. From Dr. Bear's point of view, the judicial reluctance
to recognize as probative all of the data relied upon by a diagnostician
seemed to thwart the psychiatrist's role as expert witness. From the law's
viewpoint, that reluctance is necessary to protect the jury's independence
and its ability to reach a just decision.
As Mr. Caplan explains in two chapters that lie at the heart of the
book, psychiatric testimony has become essential to any trial involving the
insanity defense. Indeed, such testimony has now assumed constitutional
dimensions. In Ake v. Oklahoma,1 2 the Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction and death-sentence of an indigent defendant. At trial, the defen-
dant had requested, but had been denied, access to a psychiatrist. The
Supreme Court held that "when a defendant has made a preliminary
showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a signifi-
cant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to
a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise
afford one."" The Court's holding is grounded squarely on the require-
ments of due process. The Court concluded that the defendant's interest in
presenting an insanity defense is great, the state's interest in refusing to
provide psychiatric assistance is slight, and that, absent such assistance,
"the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.""'
The Court's analysis of the psychiatrist's role brings two contrasting
views into sharp relief. To the majority in Ake, a psychiatrist is needed
not just to provide expert testimony but also to assist counsel in their pre-
sentation and cross-examination of the experts for the other side. Thus,
the Court explained that psychiatrists "know the probative questions to
ask of the opposing party's psychiatrist"'" and that their assistance is
needed "to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the
defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to pre-
11. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding systolic-blood-pressure
deception test inadmissible); MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 31 (E. Cleary 2d
ed. 1972) ("[O]pinion evidence is not admissible if the court believes that the state of the pertinent art
or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert.").
12. 53 U.S.L.W. 4179 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1985).
13. Id. at 4181.
14. Id. at 4183. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment only, contended that the major-
ity opinion does not apply to non-capital cases. Id. at 4184. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, did not
share that view of the Court's holding, id. at 4184-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), nor does the major-
ity's analysis support Chief Justice Burger's interpretation. My own view is that where a due process
violation occurs at the guilt-determining phase of a trial, and where the Supreme Court reverses the
underlying conviction instead of merely vacating a death sentence, there is no logical basis for distin-
guishing between capital and non-capital defendants.
15. Id. at 4182.
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sent testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a
State's psychiatric witnesses
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist took aim at the majority's characterization
of the psychiatric role. He concluded that "all the defendant should be
entitled to is one competent opinion-whatever the witness' conclu-
sion-from a psychiatrist who acts independently of the prosecutor's of-
fice."' No more should be required because "[a] psychiatrist is not an
attorney, whose job it is to advocate.""
Justice Rehnquist's view reflects the long-standing discomfort felt by
laymen and lawyers alike when faced with contradictory expert testimony.
Wigmore asserted that the partisanship of an expert witness clashes with
"that ideal of impartiality and trustworthiness which is naturally associ-
ated with abstract scientific truth.""' But, as the Hinckley trial demon-
strates, the majority view in Ake v. Oklahoma better captures the reality
of the present-day courtroom.
Still, the question posed at the outset remains. On what basis does a
juror confronted with irreconcilable expert opinions decide whether a de-
fendant is insane? Caplan's treatment of the Rufus Adams trial may an-
swer the question by analogy. Adams was charged with murder, rape, and
sodomy. The expert for the defense described Adams as a paranoid schizo-
phrenic; the expert for the prosecution conceded only that the defendant
had "some difficulty with controlling his own feelings." 0 The jury con-
16. Id. at 4183.
17. Id. at 4186 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18. Id. This debate presages what will likely be the next constitutional issue adjudicated. The
Court emphasized that the obligation of a state "is limited to provision of one competent psychiatrist
. . ." Id. at 4182. The first post-Ake question is sure to arise when the "one competent psychiatrist"
finds that the defendant is sane and, therefore, refuses to provide the form of assistance contemplated
by the majority opinion. The question for the Supreme Court will be whether the Constitution re-
quires one psychiatrist or rather one defense-oriented psychiatrist, that is, whether the Constitution
requires that an indigent defendant be permitted to interview psychiatrists until he finds one who
believes that the defendant is insane.
If the analogy between legal and psychiatric assistance is exact, then the answer will be easy: An
indigent defendant has a right to an attorney who will assist him, not just to one who listens patiently
and advises him to plead guilty. But the Supreme Court may not follow that route. First, the majority
opinion notes that one task of a psychiatrist is to help the defense to "determine whether the insanity
defense is viable," thus suggesting that the majority contemplates situations in which the psychiatrist
will conclude that the defense should not be raised. Id. at 4183. Second, the Supreme Court may
conclude that the risk of an erroneous verdict is not unconstitutionally high where an independent
psychiatrist concludes that there is no basis for an insanity defense. Such a decision would not, of
course, limit the ability of wealthier defendants to search out sympathetic expertise. See Saltzburg,
Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 635-42 (1980).
19. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENtCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 563, at 760 (J. Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1979). Wigmore's "solution" to the battle of experts-authorizing the court to select an expert
who would testify in addition to the parties' experts-is incorporated into Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. That provision has been seldom used, perhaps because judges as a group "remain
committed to adversarial responsibility for presenting evidence." 3 J. WEINSTIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 70602, at 706-12 (1982).
20. P. 54.
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victed the defendant on five counts, but acquitted him by reason of in-
sanity on the sixth count, which charged that he sodomized the victim
after her death. The jury was willing to conclude that a sane person could
murder and rape, but as one juror explained, "[it's] not a normal thing,
for a man to sodomize a dead body. '" 21 In the end, one concludes that the
jury based its decision on its collective common sense.
III.
To many people, however, the Hinckley verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity defied common sense. Caplan, in his concluding chapters, ana-
lyzes the efforts to have Congress alter the insanity defense by: (i) either
abolishing the defense (the plan initially favored by the Reagan Adminis-
tration), or revising the defense in conformity with the A.P.A. standard;
(ii) shifting the burden of proof to the defendant; or (iii) limiting the abil-
ity of psychiatrists to testify on the ultimate issue, that is, to offer an opin-
ion on whether a defendant is, in fact, legally insane.
Caplan quite properly devotes most of his attention to the issue of abol-
ishing the insanity defense. He argues that those who wish to change the
insanity defense overlook a basic, widely-held belief that "a man's free
will could be limited by mental illness."22 Thus, the abolitionists frame
the question as one of "protecting the rights of criminals versus those of
society, the forces of law against lawlessness."23 Caplan notes that the
Reagan Administration had retreated from the abolitionist position by
1984, but that the Senate in the same year passed the Insanity Defense
Reform Act,24 which codifies the A.P.A. standard. He suggests that the
Senate demonstrated "a willingness to give up a civilized standard for a
harsh reminder of the balance of power between the individual and
society."1
2 5
The general thrust of Caplan's analysis is sound, but his conclusion is
overstated. He errs, I believe, by not distinguishing between the Reagan
Administration's original position-favoring abolition of the insanity de-
fense-and the more limited revisionist position ultimately embraced by
the Senate and, after the book's publication, by the House. As demon-
strated by the second hypothetical discussed above, the new congressional
formulation does not abolish the insanity defense, although it does elimi-
nate the "volitional" prong of the A.L.I. proposal.




24. See supra note 5.
25. P. 127.
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insanity defense represents a fundamental moral choice for our legal sys-
tem. We affirm our belief in free will by recognizing that legal culpability
cannot attach to a person who, by reason of mental defect or disease, can-
not choose freely. It is not clear, however, that Congress' revision of the
insanity defense demonstrates "a willingness to give up a civilized stan-
dard," especially since the new law reaffirms the right of a defendant to
be acquitted if he "was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts." 28
The failure to distinguish between the abolitionist and revisionist views
may obscure a second ground for opposition to the insanity defense. It is
possible that opposition to verdicts such as that in the Hinckley trial
springs, at least in part, from widespread societal distrust of psychiatry
and the reliability of its diagnoses. One expression of that distrust in eve-
ryday life is the stigma that attaches in some social groups to a person
who seeks psychiatric help.2 7 Of course, no similar social opprobrium at-
taches to one who consults an orthopedic surgeon for treatment of a knee
injury or an opthalmologist for a prescription for new glasses.
I do not mean to suggest that Americans do not believe that mental
illness exists in its most extreme forms. But, as the government repeatedly
emphasized during the trial, John Hinckley did not display a complete or
extreme inability to function in society. He traveled on his own, followed
President Carter to two campaign stops, formed a plan to assassinate
President Reagan, and, when he loaded his gun, carefully selected Devas-
tator bullets. To the many Americans who doubt the validity of the
Hinckley verdict, 28 these facts may suggest that a sane man was kept from
jail with the assistance of doctors skilled in an inexact discipline.
Public statements during the congressional debate over the 1984 Act
support the view that wariness of psychiatric diagnoses fueled the aboli-
tionist and revisionist efforts. Former Attorney General Smith, for exam-
ple, criticized the insanity defense because "the disagreement of supposed
experts is perhaps so basic that it makes the jury's decision rationally im-
possible."29 In more measured tones, the American Bar Association sup-
ported elimination of the "volitional" element of the defense by arguing
that:
26. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2057 (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 20).
27. Popular entertainment presentations, for example, assume such attitudes exist. In the Hill
Street Blues television episode of January 17, 1985, for example, a character decried the fact that
police officers send silent and subtle signals to troubled members of the force that they will not be
trusted if they seek psychiatric assistance.
28. Caplan reports that an ABC News poll taken the day after the verdict showed that 83% of the
nation "thought justice was not done in the Hinckley trial." P. 116.
29. P. 115 (emphasis added).
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During the 1950s a wave of clinical optimism suggested that scien-
tific knowledge concerning psychopathology had expanded to the ex-
tent that informed judgments could be made regarding impairment
of behavioral control. That optimism was reflected in the volitional
portion of the ALI test. Yet, experience confirms that there is still no
accurate scientific basis for measuring one's capacity for self-control
or for calibrating the impairment of such capacity. There is, in short,
no objective basis for distinguishing between offenders who were un-
deterrable and those who were merely undeterred, between the im-
pulse that was irresistible and the impulse not resisted, or between
substantial impairment of capacity and some lesser impairment.30
Even the American Psychiatric Association has recognized the limits on
the reliable use of psychiatric testimony. It has championed the exclusion
of psychiatric testimony in death-sentence proceedings in which psychia-
trists may be called upon to make long-term assessments of the future
dangerousness of a defendant.3" The A.P.A. also urged Congress to elimi-
nate the volitional element of the insanity defense because "[t]he line be-
tween an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no
sharper than that between twilight and dusk.""2
Of course, doubts about the reliability of psychiatric testimony raise the
same issue involved in the dispute over the admissibility of the CAT-scan
of Mr. Hinckley's brain. If psychiatry were determined to be a discipline
without support in scientific fact, then why shouldn't psychiatric testi-
mony, like the results of polygraph tests, be excluded from criminal trials?
From this vantage point, suspicion of the insanity defense need not be
excoriated simply as a "step toward tyranny."33 It can be viewed, instead,
as an understandable concern over the manner in which psychiatric analy-
sis has been employed in support of the insanity defense.
Congress' passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 did not,
30. Pp. 119-20.
31. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3397-99 (1983) (discussing views of A.P.A.); id. at
3408-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same).
32. American Psychiatric Association, supra note 6, at 11. In addition, the A.P.A., while recog-
nizing the ability of psychiatrists reliably to diagnose a person's present or past mental condition,
cautioned against expert testimony that attempts to fit psychiatric analysis into legal terminology.
Congress responded to this critique by enacting an evidentiary provision in § 406 of the Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1984:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a
criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not
have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense
thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 406, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2067-68 (to be codified
as Rule 704(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence). Caplan suggests that this change alone will have
little effect on the jury's ability to sift through expert testimony: By his calculation, only 26 of 7,342
transcript pages from the Hinckley trial contained medical testimony on the ultimate issue of the
defendant's sanity. P. 122.
33. P. 5.
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by any means, constitute a wholesale rejection of psychiatric diagnosis or
psychiatric testimony in criminal proceedings. By eliminating the "voli-
tional" element of the defense and placing new evidentiaiy restrictions on
psychiatric testimony, Congress indicated a desire to recognize the limits
of psychiatric expertise. Neither these changes, nor the separate decision
to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, appears to justify Caplan's
conclusion that these legislators were simply accepting the Reagan Ad-
ministration's injunction that "their choice was between the forces of law
and the forces of lawlessness." '
Caplan directs only one specific criticism at the choice by Congress to
eliminate the volitional element of the insanity defense. He states that
"[t]he logic of the sponsors [of this change] was strong enough to over-
whelm their sense of reality."35 Caplan concludes, however, that "logic" is
insufficient: "Riveted on the fine points of language, [the sponsors] seemed
to think juries using their new wording would be made up of philologists,
or even lawyers and psychiatrists, who were trained to pick up all shades
of language."3"
Two difficulties arise from Caplan's analysis. First, the language at is-
sue does not appear to be unusually abstruse. The A.L.I. standard states
that "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."13 7 The new statute
basically tracks the first half of that language and omits the phrase "or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."3" To comprehend
that language should not require advanced academic training. 9
Second, Caplan's criticism is essentially nihilist: The language of the




37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, at 66 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
38. The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 provides that:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental
disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his
acts.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402(a), 1984 U.S. COVE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2057 (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 20(a)).
39. It does not seem any more complex, for example, than a standard jury instruction defining
"malice aforethought":
"Malice aforethought" means an intent, at the time of a killing, willfully to take the life of a
human being, or an intent willfully to act in callous and wanton disregard of the consequences
to human life; but "malice aforethought" does not necessarily imply any ill will, spite or ha-
tred towards the individual killed.
2 E. DEVIT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTMCE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 41.05 (3d ed.
1977).
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merely doubts the utility of any change in the wording of the insanity
defense; it does not force one to conclude that revision will worsen the
state of affairs. If the change instituted by the new statute is theoretically
sound-and Caplan does not challenge Congress' view that it is-then
Caplan's analysis fails to explain why Congress should not have acted.
In sum, concern about and opposition to the insanity defense as defined
by the jury charge in the Hinckley case and the A.L.I. standard need not
result merely from a heartless attempt to sacrifice individual liberty. The
reliability of jury verdicts, and therefore the guarantee that the law will be
applied equitably, necessarily depends on the probative value of evidence
and expert opinion presented to the jury. When significant data suggest
that the insanity defense may be encouraging the use of psychiatric testi-
mony in a manner that is neither exact nor verifiable, revision of the in-
sanity defense to reflect that concern is wholly justifiable. To this observer
at least, Congress' decision to reject the abolitionist view in favor of revis-
ing the defense seems eminently sound.
IV.
This criticism of one of Caplan's conclusions should not, however, ob-
scure the strengths of his book. Caplan's reporting of the Hinckley trial is
excellent. As an observer of some small portions of that litigation, I was
able to watch the lawyers for the government and for Hinckley at work.
Caplan has nicely captured the lawyers' individual personalities and, I
think, the manner in which their considerable talents presented the jury
with two compelling, if inconsistent, views.
More important, Caplan, through descriptions of John Hinckley and
quotations from his writings, has made Hinckley's personality come alive.
Without some understanding of Hinckley, it is not possible to comprehend
the jury's verdict. Indeed, I think that the popular disapproval of the
jury's decision resulted largely from a failure to realize the degree to
which John Hinckley was genuinely affected by his obsessions. When I
listened to the tape recording of the New Year's musings that Hinckley
made at the end of 1980, I was reminded of the Edvard Munch painting,
"The Cry," which depicts an unheard shout echoing through a bleak
landscape. Caplan similarly paints the picture of a man who inhabits a
world by himself.
Caplan also adroitly mixes factual description with the identification of
important social issues. The law, even criminal law, can be a dry subject.
But Caplan uses the now-famous facts of the Hinckley trial to identify
and discuss the fundamental social and legal questions surrounding the
use of the insanity defense. He recognizes, I think, that the criminal law is
too important to be left to lawyers, and that the definition of insanity is
1556
Vol. 94: 1545, 1985
Insanity Defense
too basic to our views of social justice to be abandoned to the diagnoses of
psychiatrists. He requires us to confront the rationale for the insanity de-
fense, the reasons why it has fallen upon disfavor, and the varying fac-
tors-like the amount of money that a defendant has to mount a de-
fense-that affect the use of the defense in the real world.
In the end, Caplan presents a pessimistic view of the willingness of
citizens and legislators to stand up for civil rights. As noted above,
Caplan's specific criticisms may be overstated, but his basic conclusion
surely is not. In an era in which the pendulum of public opinion seems to
be swinging towards social conformity, the rights of the different-of reli-
gious minorities, of criminal defendants, of the mentally ill--may seem of
little importance. Those who read Caplan's book will be reminded, how-
ever, that unpopular results are not synonymous with jurisprudential
error.
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